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## LAUNCHING A BATTLESHIP FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL WAYS.

BY WILLIAM M'ADOO, FORMERLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE  
UNITED STATES NAVY.

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GAZING at a warship lying at anchor in any of our bays, and taking in the splendid proportions, the strength, dignity and power represented by it, one's mind naturally reverts to the professional men who planned it, the builders who executed the work, and the officers and crew who man it. Here is a condensation of the best efforts of science and mechanical skill—this wonderful modern war engine, so graceful and so majestic, so instructive and pleasing to the expert critic, and so inspiring to the patriot. We can see in this embodied result the research of scientific learning, mathematical accuracy, and long and patient toil, from the day the ore left its native hills until this creation of man's experience, skill and industry appears before us as the defender of a nation's rights, liberty and honor. We imagine this ship as born in the professional council of the minds which conceived the design; but in truth hammer had never rung on its sides, nor would it have floated here, had it not been piloted skilfully through the waters of executive council and Congressional deliberation and debate.

Let us see how a warship comes to be a thing in reality from a mere conception of the professional mind. In the Navy Department there is a board composed of the heads of the Bureaus of Construction, Steam Engineering, Ordnance, Equipment, and Navigation, and Chief Intelligence Officer; and over all these is the Secretary of the Navy, who represents the President and speaks and acts for him. This board, called the Board of Construction, the General Board, of which Admiral Dewey is head, and the Chief Constructor, are the main factors in formulating

plans for new ships. The Secretary personifies the sovereignty of the civil power, as distinguished from the military or professional. He is the final and undisputed arbiter, against whose veto no action is taken, and without whose approval no official act is complete. He must be advised on the one side as to what the profession deem best for the Navy; and on the other he must be guided by the largest questions of public policy as to what is best for the nation. Before the opening of each Congress, he draws up his annual report, which is a résumé of the work of the Department for the preceding months. The wants of the service, both as to personnel and material, are stated, and Congress is urged to meet them by proper legislation.

In every report there is a building programme; that is, the Secretary states how many and what classes of ships he deems should be built in the coming year. Here is the genesis of the battleship. Before he commits himself to recommendations, he consults the professional advisers in the Department, and his recommendation as to numbers and types is generally, though not always, a consensus of professional opinion. There have been striking instances in the civil history of the Navy where the Secretary has gotten his plans outside of the Navy Department and pushed his own policy into practice as to the number and kind of ships to be built; if he so desires he has the unquestioned power to do so. Once, however, the Secretary and the General Board, which corresponds in practice somewhat to the British Admiralty, have agreed on the character of the ships, the Bureaus of Construction, Steam Engineering, Ordnance and Equipment, begin the elaboration of plans. All questions of weights, displacement and speed are put through the crucible of most careful analysis and accurate calculation; every calculation is verified again and again; models are made and tested in the proving tank at the Washington Navy Yard; all friction between the different bureaus, if any arises, must be harmonized. The hull with its armor must be capable of carrying the requirements as to ordnance; the engines, as to weight, space and speed, must meet the requirements of the completed design; the equipment must make the ship efficient, comfortable and sanitary, so as to keep at their best the living intelligences which are to inhabit her, and without which, however otherwise powerful, she would be an inert and dead thing.

The Secretary having concluded his labors and made his recommendations, reports the results to the President. Unless the President agrees to the report the recommendations are not made to Congress, and all the departmental labors will have been for naught. The President having agreed to the Secretary's report, generally embodies in his annual message his views regarding the policies recommended. His endorsement of the Secretary's recommendations for building new ships may be either positive and earnest, or conventional and conservative. The recommendations of the Executive are, so far as the building of new ships is concerned, first taken up by the House of Representatives. The report is referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, which is composed of seventeen men. The chairman of this committee and a majority of its members belong to the party controlling the House.

Our ship has now entered the stormy and sometimes dangerous waters of Congressional life. She may have received the professional and departmental sanction, but she is very likely to encounter here critics, and, possibly, enemies. Her fate is before these seventeen men. If a majority of them decide to leave her out of the appropriation bill she will vanish into the ghostland of unacted resolutions. These men are the jurors and are sovereign in their decision so far as the House is concerned. They may, if they wish, reject the highest expert opinion, and may, and very frequently do, make a naval programme of their own. Here is seen the influence of that latent jealousy which exists in all countries between the civilian and the professional soldier and sailor. It is not a turbulent and factious opposition, but one who has listened to the debates can readily see how reluctant the civilian representative is to accepting professional advice if it is thrust upon him cavalierly, and without due acknowledgment of his powers. "I know more about building a ship than you do," says the professional authority, "and you should accept my opinions without question." "You shall build no ships unless you convince me," is the retort of the civilian. It generally happens, too, that in any contest of this kind, professional opinion is divided, so that a representative who opposes the official recommendations can readily find experts to whom he can appeal in behalf of his contention—officers in and out of the service, within, of course, the limits of the Naval Regulations; naval architects, ship build-

ers, specialist writers for newspapers and magazines on questions relating to the Navy and the building of warships, and foreign opinions of a professional or other character from a multitude of sources. A strong-minded chairman of committee having his colleagues well in hand might easily defeat the united professional recommendation, say, for superimposed turrets, and in the debate in the House, composed altogether of laymen, so take advantage of professional differences in the naval world as to convince the majority that he had the best of the argument. These seventeen men, who now labor in travail with the future warship, represent many callings and all sections of the country. In times past, in the long and bitter struggles that begot the first of the New Navy, the opposition showed political, sectional, temperamental and economic differences, and sociological distrust of a professional, military body of any kind, and at times, it must be confessed, a lamentable ignorance of the subject. At the legislative beginnings of the New Navy its worst enemy was indifference. The naval question was entirely subordinated to economic ones. You could fill the House to build a post-office; you could scarcely ever get a quorum to listen to a debate on a battleship. Many otherwise patriotic men believed that war was over, and to none did this seem more plausible than to the survivors on both sides of the great civil strife through which the Republic had passed.

The Naval Affairs Committee is divided into sub-committees following the leading subjects of appropriation, such as ordnance, and construction and repairs. This latter sub-division is the first to consider the building programme. This sub-committee makes its report to the full committee. If the House is in political sympathy with the Executive, and the Secretary of the Navy for the time being has those personal qualities which commend him to members of the committee who belong to the same political party, the views of the Department will have great weight. It is always fortunate for the Navy when the Secretary commands the respect, confidence and good will of the chairmen of the Naval Affairs Committees in the House and Senate; and it does not always follow that a Congress of the same political faith with the President will follow his views on the naval programme, if they differ with him on other subjects. Friction of a political or personal character between the Executive and Congress will always endanger the execution of the Depart-

ment's policy, and in cases of this character the Secretary may find warmer friends among the party in opposition than among those who belong to his own party. It is in this respect that the personality of the Secretary becomes a great factor in the case. A personal disagreement which has given offence to a leading member of either committee in the House or Senate may beget bitter, revengeful, and relentless opposition to any policy he may propose. Nice questions in the matter of official patronage; the extension of official courtesies, and the giving of intentional or unintended offence, may make a Secretary many enemies. Under normal conditions, and outside of the stress of war or great public enthusiasm, such as followed the battles of Manila and Santiago, harmonizing influences must be constantly at work to carry on a project such as the upbuilding of the Navy, at once national in its larger aims and local and sectional in its actual construction. It is different in England, where all parties are for naval increase, but in Germany, as here, other questions interlace with the naval one, and the government's programme has often no easy road, but in Germany the general and well rounded building scheme is never compromised as to details. Other great appropriations submitted to Congress have behind them the brutal and debauching "pork barrel" argument. You can scatter post-offices and court-houses with a lavish hand, as the farmer sows his seed, and battalions of votes will marshal themselves to defend their local interests; and when you rain the contents of the national treasury over a happy land to make waters flow where none flowed before, or check them from flowing where now the sea surges, nearly every hand is out to grasp at the golden shower, and the voice of every district, not excepting the arid lands, is warning the unhappy representative, on pain of political oblivion, to get his full share, and, if possible, a little more. A member may vote against battleships who would expire at the very thought of opposing a pension bill, without regard to its amount or its justice. At some time in his life every citizen has been in a post-office, or has certainly received a letter; millions will live and die without ever having viewed a warship, and thousands of good patriots are personally better acquainted with the local letter-carrier than they are with Admiral Dewey.

It is different with questions relating to the Army. The Navy is unlike the Army in this respect—that it has practically

no professional representatives in either House. In both Houses of Congress the soldiers of both the Union and Confederate Armies are well represented; not so with the sailors. Even in the greatest navy, the personnel is insignificant in numbers as compared with that of a great army. Six hundred men on board a battleship may, in a decisive conflict, at an important point, do or undo the work of a whole army corps; and yet, when the war is over and the relative numbers melt back again into the mass of citizens, the sailor bears a ridiculous proportion to those who fought on land. A great army represents hundreds of thousands of homes where a deep personal interest is taken in its movements, and a strong attachment and loyalty is formed for all its members. After the conflict is over, its influence on the civil administration is very great and far-reaching. The military element, by which is meant the ex-soldiers in both Houses, while generally friendly to the increase of the naval establishment, are often indifferent critics; and in the beginnings of the New Navy it was hard to convince the veterans of 1861-5 how thoroughly obsolete the ordnance and ships of that period were, and how largely modern tactics and weapons have discounted the greatest gallantry and personal bravery.

The sub-committee having reported their findings to the larger committee, the bill is then dealt with as a whole. The first consideration is as to the total amount of all the appropriations, which has to be carefully compared with those of other years. If the keynote of the session is economy, the chairman of the committee is solemnly warned by the leaders of his party in the House that all the appropriations must be unsparingly pared. He hears on all sides mutterings of bitter opposition to any increase over the preceding session. If in the country at large there is a national issue on economical administration, his party colleagues will bring every pressure to bear on him in order that his appropriation may not exceed that of the Opposition when last in power. Under such conditions the bill is before the whole committee; with an earnest endeavor to keep down the aggregate, it will be impossible to meet all the demands of the establishment, and some otherwise laudable projects will have to suffer delay or permanent defeat. Shall we give up a dock for a battleship, a machine-shop for a gunboat, a cruiser for a thousand additional men; shall we reduce the scrub-women and increase the

torpedo-boats? The committee as a whole is generally favorable to naval increase, and the following epitome of difference does not apply to it as a sample of its deliberations.

"Gentlemen," says a member from an Eastern seaport, "my people are at the mercy of England and Germany, and I have been told confidentially that we are practically defenseless. What we want are battleships that can stand up and fight, and quick enough to manœuvre with good speed. They are the cheapest defence on the whole, and there is no substitute for them. Let us have real fighting-ships, not make-believe fighting-ships. If we have to fight at all we want to fight well; we don't want canal-boats with painted ports, or converted cattle-ships, or Jules Verne's lobster chasers." "Let us go slow," says a member from the interior. "Appropriations are very great. If Kaiser Wilhelm's battleships can get up Sinkinany creek in the month of August, they don't draw enough water to mix a cup of tea in the House restaurant. What we want to do is to chase the big merchant-ships, build fast cruisers that will run down the merchant-marine and fine the enemy in hard cash; destroy his merchant-marine, as England indirectly destroyed ours during the Civil War. Let us have one with a thirty-knot speed, so that she can catch the 'Lucania' and 'Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse.' If she can run for them and run from them, she can do them up with a few duck-guns, so that you needn't pay much attention to ordnance, but just fill her up with engines, and give her six screws." "Well," says the Eastern seaboard members, "let us compromise, and in order to be sure that the battleship will not get us into any trouble with foreign nations, let us call her a 'coast-defence' battleship."

Here it may be stated that the first battleships built were designated by the Department itself as "coast-defence" battleships. These terms were undoubtedly used, as a matter of policy, to avoid Congressional opposition and meet the objections of those members and senators who were sternly opposed to our becoming a world power in the naval sense. These men believed that a battleship, simply for coast-defense, might be all right, but that a battleship which could steam across the ocean and fight would be a great national menace. The so-called coast-defence battleships are effective engines of war in the Far East, and would be safer for a trip around the world than the best Atlantic liner.



"I am opposed," says another member, "to building a battleship, and believe we should build small gun-boats." "And I," says another, "believe we should build torpedo-boats." "I, gentlemen," says another, "believe we should eliminate the whole programme and build submarine boats." "I object to the naval programme," says another member, "because the Navy is entirely an Eastern project, and all the money spent in its building is expended there and benefits that section alone." This last narrow and unpatriotic argument never found any great number of advocates. Indeed, some of the staunchest and best friends of the upbuilding of the Navy came from the Middle and Far West.

The committee generally gives hearings to the naval officers of the Department, and often requests the presence of the Secretary himself to explain in detail the proposed naval programme. Here the tact and diplomacy of the Executive office come into play. Individual members frequently come to the Department and ask for professional explanations of the character of the proposed work. If the ship is ever to be built, a wise Secretary will understand at once that the members of the committee must be reasoned with, and the whole machinery of the Department, if necessary, put in action for their enlightenment. Frequent visiting of the existing warships is a kind of object-lesson teaching which is most efficacious. Private friendships existing between naval officers and members and senators are sometimes of more effect than long range discussions; and, above and beyond all, nowhere is the press more potent. Intelligent discussions in the great dailies, in magazines and books, are very apt to affect the Congressional mind. The rudder which steers the Congressional ship through the fogs of committee debate, personal differences and the clash of interests is the aroused intelligence and forcibly expressed opinion of the majority of the people. As in nearly all cases in deliberative bodies, the programme finally agreed upon is one of compromises. It was only last winter that the country saw the whole naval programme held up for months in the fierce controversy as to the building of additional submarine boats. Often the proud squadron of battleships on paper which sets out from the granite building on Pennsylvania Avenue, emerges from the committee room on Capitol Hill decimated in numbers and reduced in proportions. The lay architect has taken a hand. Backed by the expert critics of the official proposals, he has in-

creased or decreased the number of guns, made them rapid of fire or otherwise, fixed new standards of speed, and marred or improved, as only the future can tell. Here is the weakest point in our naval progress, begetting lack of uniformity in type and of continuity of the building programme. A great, harmonious professional scheme having a definite end wanders off into needless varieties, halts, and all but stops one year, and rushes recklessly forward the year following.

The committee having agreed on the bill, it is reported to the House, accompanied by a report, generally more or less argumentative and statistical. The committee now has the laboring oar. It has worked for months on the bill in a strong educational atmosphere, and in more or less constant touch with the Department and the naval profession. Many of its members have listened to professional arguments, and have read carefully much professional matter in books and elsewhere. They have crammed up on the history of naval progress. They must now convert their less fortunate fellows. The first essential for the success of the new ship is that the committee shall be united. A divided committee in an indifferent or unfriendly House might as well abandon its programme. If the committee is thoroughly aroused to the patriotic duty of insuring the building of the new ships, the members have to become missionaries among their fellows. The proposed ship is now sailing on dangerous and tempestuous waters. She must be piloted by a clear head, a steady hand and a quick eye. She has passed out of the bay into the open waters of the Congressional Sea, into which we shall try to follow her.

She is now in the House and well within the range of another committee fortification. The cold, critical eyes of the leaders of the Committee on Appropriations, which, next to that of Ways and Means, is by far the most powerful committee in the House, are upon her. This committee, until some years ago, handled practically all of the appropriations, including that for the naval establishment. They resented bitterly the division of their powers, and in fact withstood repeated assaults before the present rules were finally carried. It is no charge against the patriotism of the members of this committee to say that it is very doubtful, had the rule remained unchanged, if the New Navy could have been built at all. Through this committee, as through a flood gate, rushed the enormous appropriations for the whole

conduct of the government. In the turbulent outrush of waters which threaten to drain the reservoir, the general inclination is very properly to lower the sluice gate. The grand totals are always in view; the enormous physical task of examining into these vast and widespread expenditures is of itself sufficient to prevent such a great, national, international, scientific, and mechanical subject as the Navy from receiving the consideration to which it is entitled; the overworked members, struggling in a chaos of statistics and disordered heaps of figures, have no time for careful and studious consideration of great and far-reaching questions of national and international importance. Among the members of this committee the appropriations for the increase of the Navy have found their most earnest and critical opponents.

The bill is to be assailed with broadsides of figures; comparisons with other appropriations, cost of maintenance of warships, cost of deviation from plans, increase in actual expenditures over estimates, difference in cost of ships of the same type, with decided preference for the most economic ship at the possible sacrifice of the most efficient one. Sometimes this opposition is very bitter and determined, and if the bill is not to be lost, the Naval Affairs Committee must countermine against the enemy's arithmetic, oppose the narrow objections of locality with the greater wants of the nation, defend the wisdom of professional experience against the pretensions of lay ignorance, and place their chief reliance on the general patriotism and pride of country of the majority of their colleagues.

The appropriation bills in the House, being placed on the calendar irregularly, come up without any special regard to order in the later weeks of the session. To each bill is assigned a day for general debate, to be followed by reading in Committee of the Whole, section by section, and then more debate to close. The order and length of debate are generally governed by a resolution of the Committee on Rules, made an order of the House. In the general debate the chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee is supposed to enlighten the House fully on all the features of the bill, dwelling, of course, more especially on the increase of the Navy. This debate at times, of late years, has become very spirited and often heated. The magnitude of the sums involved and the questions of national and international policies are so interlaced that there is a wide range of discussion.

Sometimes the debate wanders off into side issues, in which the original question is lost sight of. Sometimes it becomes personal, sectional and partisan. Much depends on the chairman of the committee; he requires a thorough knowledge of his subject, expertness in debate, tact, diplomacy and good judgment, and, above all, the confidence of his colleagues. If his personal relations are unpleasant with the body of the membership, some of his colleagues on the committee must shoulder most of the work. When the New Navy was first started the opposition was not so much partisan, in that it did not follow the cleavage between the two political parties, but it was mostly personal and sectional. The opposition might be classified as, first, the general opposition to any professional military establishment, arising from a fear that a great navy would be a temptation to war, and also the source of very large expenditures; secondly, an opposition arising from a doubt in the lay mind as to whether or not the present ships, so rapid was the progress of naval architecture, would not become obsolete in a few years. This feeling was much augmented by the constant exploiting in the press and elsewhere of new weapons of offence and defence alleged to be powerful, and was heightened by discordance in the professional world on much debated questions of ships, ordnance and armor; and, lastly, a small, but bitter, opposition from the interior of the country based on the contention that the eastern and western seaboard were not so much affected by the lack of naval defence as by their eagerness to stimulate and enrich their shipbuilding plants at the expense of the Government. This last objection has been very much weakened by the fact that, in the construction of the Navy, a large number of industries, extending more or less over all the manufacturing and mining districts of the country, have been employed; and, besides, as the Navy increased, the naval stations and supply depots became more numerous, not only on the Atlantic but also on the Gulf and Pacific coasts; but, better perhaps than any economic argument based on local conditions as to expenditures, was the powerful appeal to sentiment by the felicitous practice of naming the ships after cities and States. A glance at the list in the Naval Register will show that, in this distribution, astute and diplomatic Secretaries of the Navy were quick to give due honor to interior cities and States. We are speaking now more particularly of the period before the Spanish War, the

brilliant and almost miraculous victories in that war having, it is believed, practically done away with all sectional opposition; so that this in the future is very likely to become a minor factor.

The larger question as to how great a navy we shall need is one on which men will honestly differ, according to their conception as to what is the true mission of the Republic, and what the best policy for its welfare. The friends of the Navy have always insisted that the larger the Navy the greater is the security for peace, on the same principle that the larger the police force the more safety there is for life and property; that a rich nation, weak in its naval and military defence, would be a great temptation to the covetous, overtaxed, less prosperous, but strongly armed, nations of Europe; that our diplomacy, however based on justice and ethical right, would be entirely impotent in dealing with those who, as a rule, recognize no right which has not the might to defend it; that the Navy, especially on this great hemisphere, is a civilizing influence; that the fathers of the Republic in the very articles of the Constitution\* show that they did not blend their distrust of a professional military establishment with that of a proper naval defence, believing that a Navy had never imperilled the liberties of the country which created it; that the growth of our trade and the increase of our shipping demanded an increase of the Navy for their protection; that the economy of the naval budget was not to be judged by the amount but by the necessity of the expenditure it proposed, subject, however, to a strict supervision to the end of ensuring an aggressively honest administration. In all these debates the friends of the Navy had a powerful weapon in the admittedly high sense of honor and integrity of naval officers in the details of honest supervision and the high traditions of the service forbade criticism of their motives, even if one disagreed with their judgment.

The debate having consumed the time allotted to it, the bill is then read, section by section, in the committee of the whole House. Sometimes special paragraphs, such as increase of the Navy, are here again reserved for debate, limited to a certain time. The leaders of the House, if the debate becomes important, take part in this discussion. The bill is then voted on by roll call, and, if passed, is properly engrossed and sent to the Senate.

\* Vide Art. I., Sec. 8, "To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money for that use shall be for a longer period than two years: to provide and maintain a navy."

It may be said that the fate of the New Navy at one time hung largely on the decision of the member who was acting temporarily for the Speaker. The opponents of the Naval Appropriation took the ground that, at each session, the amount to be expended on ships authorized by law had to be especially appropriated for as new law, in separate bills, instead of as a continuing public work. Mr. McCreery, of Kentucky, in the chair, decided that it was a continuing public work and not a new law, and therefore the moneys could be appropriated in the general appropriation bill, and not by special bills for each ship as if it were a public building.

The bill has now gone to the Senate Committee. Our ship has sailed through Statuary Hall, past the august chamber of the Supreme Court, and finds herself anchored in the finely decorated and more or less imposing room of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the Senate. Remembering the provision of the Constitution that all appropriations must originate in the House, one might suppose that these gentlemen had been patiently awaiting the action of the House and the arrival of our warship. Such, however, in practice is far from being the case. Our ship finds herself in a crowded harbor; the Senate Committee has already constructed a programme of their own. Warships above and below the water, docks, novel weapons, battleships, gunboats, armor plate, litter this naval station of the Senate. As oblivious of the House as if the latter had been sitting in Jefferson City, Missouri, and legislating for Pike county, the Senate had considered the estimates, examined and cross-examined officers and experts, given hearings on independent bills for the construction of various craft and weapons of war, and practically formulated its own bill. The senatorial scissors and blue pencil, it can be seen at a glance, will be freely used. The Senate being a smaller body, each member has an unlimited chance of debate, senatorial courtesy rules, and the personal influence of an able and popular Senator is so powerful that the entire atmosphere surrounding the Naval Bill is more or less changed. The consideration given by the Senate Committee to the House bill is more or less, outside of conventional details, a comparison of their own bill with that of the House. The Senate Committee being the agents of a smaller and more compact body are able to give more careful attention and investigation than can the House Committee. They have,

moreover, this advantage: all of the Senators are elected for a longer term, and many of them have long records of service on the Naval Affairs Committee, so that they have acquired, if only by absorption, a wider range of knowledge regarding the subject. They have in the course of a senatorial career ample opportunity for personal observation of the actual workings of the Naval service. The Department is glad at all times to extend every possible courtesy to a Senator seeking information, and more especially to those on the committee which has charge of its affairs. All the sources of the Navy Department's information are at its command; it sits as a court of appeals to review the verdicts of the House and the decisions of its committee. Here the personality of the Senator is all important. The chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, for the best interests of the Navy, should, if possible, be in harmony on the naval question with the President and the Secretary, and as well informed as they are. A radical and personal difference between him and the Department will place our proposed ship in very dangerous waters. She will never meet in a long naval career more skilful opponents, more deadly tacticians, more persistent and successful strategists; her dangers are far greater in the apparently smooth waters of the committee harbor than in the open sea of the Senate Chamber. A whispered conversation of five minutes between two powerful Senators may wreck her on a hidden reef, or sink her without a moment's warning. The naval Senator, too, has not the same dread of contemporary opinion; he can afford to discount the pressure of the moment and is not always pursued by the shadow of the biennial nominating convention. In justice, however, to the Senate Committee it should be said that it has been characterized by a fair and equitable disposition to give full and patient hearings on the merits of the question, and has always been courteously kind in allowing both sides to enlighten it with their views.

The opposition in the Senate proper follows somewhat the same lines as in the House, but has at times been characterized by much more bitterness in debate, and by bolder charges and fiercer criticism of persons and things. The ability of every Senator to take the floor gives the widest possible range to discussion. The Senate Committee's bill has now engulfed the House bill, and is frequently marked by independence of both House

and Department. Of course, at times there is more or less substantial agreement; but now and again, as was shown last session, an intense and irreconcilable divergence between the two programmes springs up, and the contention is carried to the very last minutes of the session, to the peril of public business.

So marked has been the influence of the Senate in shaping the programme for naval increase, that very frequently independent propositions, which could not obtain the consent of the Department, ignore the House entirely and make their fight before the Senate Committee. When the naval appropriation bill is brought up in the Senate, certain Senators, by right of long, consecutive service on the Naval Affairs Committee, are given great consideration by the main body. United and determined opposition by these Senators to the Department's proposals would make their success very doubtful. These Senators have studied the naval question more or less, and have convictions on certain phases of the subject which it is hard to overcome. In both Houses our battleship is always imperilled by Senators and members who have adopted certain professional theories. When the first battleships were being provided for, the opposition rallied around a counter-programme for building monitors. The men forming this opposition were entirely honest, and were led on the outside by a distinguished and gallant admiral then in the service who believed at that time, and no doubt believes now, that a monitor is superior as a fighting machine to any battleship. As a matter of parliamentary tactics, a member or senator who believes the Navy is large enough has a very friendly welcome for any innovator who may propose anything as a substitute for the battleship or armored cruiser. In making up a successful programme, our battleship must sometimes find herself among odd marine collections. Shipbuilding plants and navy yards far apart in the different sections of the country have to be considered as possible competitive bidders. Small yards in one section where they can only build gunboats will of course desire to have more or less of these ships in the bill; and with the renewed activity in American shipbuilding, yards have sprung up in the far northwest and northeast, and signs of activity are seen on the Gulf, while the Lake region has made a most determined effort to have the treaty with Great Britain abrogated, so that gunboats might be built in the well-equipped plants of the Lake cities.



The debate in the Senate, unlike that in the House, has practically no limit. The average member of the House has to confine himself to his five minutes on a *pro-forma* amendment. A Senator can talk until exhausted on any phase of the naval question, or on subjects far removed from it. In the long, and sometimes bitter, debates in the Senate, the lines of division are more sharply accentuated than in the House. Certain Senators may be called an academic opposition, expressing jealousy of all naval and military establishments, and allowing for no difference between the army and navy as imperialistic and unrepugnant institutions, and giving voice to a glowing optimism in unarmed morality and unprotected justice, and a radical distrust of adding to the personnel of a professional military body; criticism of the prerogatives of those holding life offices, whether naval or civilian; others conduct their opposition under the general banner of retrenchment; and, lastly, there is the class alluded to above, who criticise the proposed programme from a more or less naval standpoint. Sometimes an unexpressed conviction that the appropriations should be cut down will lead to objections to the technical programme. The ships are too large; naval architects are in doubt; the ships are too small; there are proposed novelties in them; it would be better to wait for further investigation; many types are becoming obsolete; there are frauds in naval armor; the Government is being defrauded; more work should be done in the navy yards; all work should be done by contract; let us wait until we can all agree—these and many other objections are put forward with no little skill and ability. A strong, earnest appeal by the President on a question like that of the Navy is bound to have great effect, not only with his own party, but with the opposition. Sometimes our battleship is lost sight of entirely in the heat of a Senatorial debate; those bitter and relentless personal feuds which have unfortunately arisen with regard to officers in the service are brought forth, and an acrimonious debate ensues to the great injury of the service.

It would be unjust to the Senate in passing not to say that some of the speeches delivered on naval subjects, both as to material and personnel, are masterly and thoughtful, both those for and against naval increase.

Possessing such powers, the Senate works under greater external pressure from the interests concerned than does the House.

As in the House, so in the Senate, the general Appropriations Committee has to be admitted into a sort of partnership with the Naval Committee proper in superintending the development and scope of the bill, and especially as regards the actual amount of money to be expended. A great navy is proportionately much more expensive than a great army. A warship requires constant and unremitting attention to keep her in good condition; every foot she moves is at an expenditure for coal; in the course of a year she travels many thousands of miles, involving two great items for coal and oil; shifts in her crew to and from foreign stations require costly transportation; in foreign ports she is more or less at the mercy of local coal-dealers and repair-shops, so that, in addition to her great original cost, it needs a large outlay to keep her fit. This gives the critics of large expenditures an opportunity for invidious, and sometimes unjust, comparison between the aggregates for appropriations for the Army and Navy. A fort having 600 men represents nothing like the expense of a battleship with a smaller number of sailors in her crew. Her first cost is necessarily large, and to keep her in good condition there must be yards at various points, with docks capable of receiving her, surrounded by machine-shops and endless supplies to repair her in case of damage. She has to be fitted out with every appliance. She is a city in herself; she distils her own water; she makes her own electricity; she manufactures her own ice; she must have a perfect sewerage and ventilating system; she must have proper kitchens for all divisions of her crew, suitable sleeping and living apartments for her officers and men, a well-conditioned hospital, a library and a church; and last, but not least, she must have a prison and a police force.

When the debate is ended and the bill has been passed it is sent to the House. Here and there, if they are fortunate, the House members may see some faint traces of their work. Sometimes, in happy years, radical features remain untouched. The House Committee, after considering the bill, generally reports to the House that they dissent from certain Senate amendments, and the bill is returned to the Senate. The Senate reports the bill back to the House, refusing to accede to certain amendments, which are designated, and they ask that conferrees be appointed on the part of the House. The Senate and House appoint conferrees, three on each side. Now comes the real tug of war. Our

battleship is ready for the launching, but if her friends are not pulling hard and steady on the ropes she may never feel the water beneath her keel. In this conference sometimes the bill undergoes radical changes in the matter of concessions and counter-concessions. The debate in the House and Senate will probably show that each body is determined on some one feature of the programme which is in opposition to that advocated by the other. The House bill will generally come nearer to the Department's wishes than that framed by the Senate. The fate of the bill in the Senate is practically in the hands of the Senators in the conference. If they are doggedly stubborn, with a small and compact body behind them, they have the advantage. This, however, is not always the case. If the House committee is determined and united, or if its chairman throws his personality with great vigor into the contest, and can manage to hold the confidence of the House, the appropriation bill may fail if the Senate does not give way. These meetings between the conferrees at the close of an exciting session are at times marked by more or less personal feeling and great stubbornness on both sides. In this game the able and shrewd diplomats of the Senate may prove themselves masterful tacticians. Before our battleship emerges from this last and bitter contest she may have parted company with many of her fellows. The angry waters of the Senatorial whirlpool have absorbed them; her sister ships have been lost in the mysterious fogs of Senatorial diplomacy and finesse, or have gone down in raging armor-plate hurricanes, typhoons of personal contention, or perished in pitiless storms of economic sleet and snow, or been wrecked on the jagged rocks of the general opposition to a great naval establishment.

In the expiring hours of Congress, often in the early hours of morning, the opposition have had to let go their hold from sheer physical exhaustion, and our battleship is launched from the Congressional ways. Her total cost is fixed in the bill, and there is an appropriation made for beginning her construction. This total cost fixed at the time is often increased by subsequent bills, so that it is not always a criterion of the actual cost of a warship. Departmental deviation from the original plans, delays and other causes, may add to the total. Our battleship can now come proudly down Pennsylvania Avenue to receive the Presidential blessing in the shape of his signature to the bill. She must now

run the gauntlet of the sharply competing shipbuilders who are looking after the interests of the various establishments. To comply with the law, proposals and specifications are carefully compiled by the Navy Department and bids are asked. Frequently, shipbuilding firms will make two offers for the same ship, one on the Department's plans, and one on plans proposed by themselves. The bidding for the first battleships was naturally confined to one or two establishments. In fact, there was practically only one capable of doing such work on the east coast. There is generally a provision, as a concession to section—if there are two battleships, say—that one shall be built on the Pacific Coast; and, in consideration of the increased cost of labor and materials there, a certain percentage is granted to Pacific builders over their eastern competitors. If the law has allowed the Department the option, there is always a pressure to build some of these ships in the navy yards, and the Congressional delegations from States having such establishments are very apt to make themselves more or less felt. The bids being received and the contracts prepared, the Department is sometimes confronted with grave questions as to their proper distribution, having in view what is best for the interests of the Government, the capacity of the establishment, its ability to do the work in a given time, and, of course, the lowness of the bid.

Our ship has crossed the great civilian seas of contention; she is now in professional waters, endangered only as to her physical characteristics by possible frictions between the builders and the Department. In about two years, while her officers and men stand at salute and the band plays "The Star Spangled Banner," the flag so dear to all of us will slowly climb its staff, and she will go into commission and become a very part of our nation, representing the august sovereignty of eighty millions of free people, as the defender of their honor, their rights and liberties; a mighty engine of militant civilization, in peace discouraging war, and in war commanding an honorable peace.

WILLIAM McADOO.